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II. GRAND CHAMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A, B & C V 
IRELAND, DECISION OF 17 DECEMBER 2010 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The use of ‘European consensus’ as a decision-making mechanism of the European Court of 
Human Rights has been condemned and praised in almost equal measure.
1
 On the one hand, 
some scholars argue that the way in which so-called ‘consensus’ is identified is generally 
unsound and lacking in rigour.
2
 It is also claimed that European consensus is overly subjective in 
its nature
3
 and, in any case, that it undermines the principle that the Convention has an 
autonomous meaning determined by the Court and separate to what member States do or 
interpret it as meaning.
4
 On the other hand there are scholars who, while often concerned with 
the sub-optimal methodology adopted in identifying and using European consensus in the 
decisions of the Court, recognise the method’s potential to increase the legitimacy of the Court 
and its function as a mechanism for the progressive liberalisation of the European public order.
5
 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g, G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2009) 120-
131; G Letsas, ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR’ (2004) 15 EJIL 279; JL Murray, 
‘Consensus: concordance, or hegemony of majority’ in Dialogues between Judges (Council of Europe, 2008); E 
Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 JILP 843; A McHarg, 
‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 62 MLR 671; JA Brauch, ‘The Margin of 
Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004) 11 
CJEL 113; F de Londras, ‘International Human Rights Law and Constitutional Rights: In Favour of Synergy’ (2009) 
9 IR Constitutionalism 307; K Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 GLJ 1730; P Martens, 'Perplexity of the National Judge Faced with the 
Vagaries of European Consensus' in Dialogues between Judges (Council of Europe, 2008); L Helfer, ‘Consensus, 
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1993) 23 Cornell ILJ 133; C McCrudden, ‘A Common 
Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 4 OJLS 499; M 
Delmas-Marty, ‘A 'Reasoned' Conception of the Reason of State’ in M Delmas-Marty (ed), The European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. International Protection versus National Restrictions (Kluwer, 
1992). 
2
 Y Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence 
of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002), 192-3; P Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method in Judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Reference Back to National Law’ in G Canviet et al (eds), Comparative Law Before the Courts 
(BIICL, 2004), 149. 
3
 P Martens, 'Perplexity of the National Judge Faced with the Vagaries of European Consensus' in Dialogues 
between Judges (Council of Europe, 2008), 79. 
4
  Letsas ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR’ (n 1) 304; Benvenisti (n 1) 851. 
5
 See eg K Dzehtsiarou, ‘Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ [2011] PL 534; Helfer (n 1). 
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This reflects the fact that, generally speaking, European consensus has been applied in order to 
establish an expanded scope of protection for the Convention in areas not expressly mentioned 
within it or contemplated at the time of its drafting, on the basis that there is an identifiable trend 
(although, in strict linguistic terms, not an actual ‘consensus’) among other European States to 
protect the alleged right.
6
  
Although respondent States had occasionally attempted to justify their derogation from the 
European consensus or trend on the basis of an internal consensus—understood as a generally 
held moral value or judgement within the State in question—those attempts had been 
unsuccessful prior to the important decision of the Grand Chamber in A, B & C v Ireland.
7
 In that 
case, the Court found that Ireland’s extremely restrictive stance on the availability of abortion 
was justifiable and compatible with the Convention on the basis of an alleged internal consensus 
(in favour of a very restrictive abortion regime in Ireland) that trumped the European consensus 
(evidencing a much more liberalised abortion regime).
8
 
In this article, we argue that the proposition that an internal consensus could ‘trump’ 
European consensus is troubling from a constitutionalist perspective. The European Court of 
Human Rights is at the heart of the constitutionalising process in the continent of Europe, laying 
down minimum standards for rights protections in 47 countries and, indeed, in the European 
Union as an autonomous institution.
9
 To allow the alleged values of a particular State to be 
exempted from the general minimum standard and, potentially, to usher in a reduction of that 
minimum standard as a consequence thereof, is clearly out of step with the development of a 
European public order. Not only that, but it raises questions about the legitimacy and coherence 
of the rights-based harmonising project to which the Convention is core, and the role of the 
                                                 
6
 Dzehtsiarou, ibid, 541-8. 
7
 A, B and C v Ireland, Application No 25579/05, Judgment of 16 December 2010. 
8
 We are not concerned here with the impact of A, B & C v Ireland on Ireland’s abortion regime per se. On this see 
B Daly, ‘Access to Abortion Services: The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in Ireland’ (2011) 
30 Med L. 267; B Daly, ‘”Braxton Hick’s” or the Birth of a New Era? Tracing the Development of Ireland’s 
Abortion Laws in Respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (2011) 18 EJ Health L 375. 
9
 The Lisbon Treaty and Protocol 14 to the ECHR provided the legal basis for the European Union to become a 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights, the final negotiations for which are underway. See, eg, M 
Kuijer, ‘The Accession of the European Union to the ECHR: A Gift for the ECHR’s 60th Anniversary or an 
Unwelcome Intruder at the Party?’ (2011) 3 Amsterdam Law Forum 17; X Groussot, T Lock & L Pech, ‘EU 
Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: A Legal Assessment of the Draft Accession Agreement of 
14
th
 October 2011’ European Issues No. 218 (Fondation Robert Schuman, 2011); T Lock, ‘EU Accession to the 
ECHR: Implications for the Judicial Review in Strasbourg’, (2010) 35 ELRev 777. 
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European Court of Human Rights within it.
10
 We begin with an outline of the concept of 
‘trumping internal consensus’ and a summary of its application in A, B & C v Ireland before 
proceeding to our core objections to its use by the Strasbourg Court.  
 
B. Trumping Internal Consensus 
 
European consensus is not entirely what it says on the tin. Rather than describing a literal 
‘consensus’ position on a particular question between all of the member States to the 
Convention, ‘European consensus’ as deployed by the Strasbourg Court might be more 
accurately described as an identifiable trend or commonality among at least some members of 
the Council of Europe in relation to the matter at hand.
11
 Once identified, European consensus is 
usually deployed to determine whether the Convention can be said to provide certain protection 
within the banner of Convention rights, where such protection is not expressly mentioned in the 
Convention itself (e.g. LGBT rights being given protection under the banner of Article 8 in spite 
of their unenumerated status
12
). Usually the question of European consensus arises only in 
situations where it is not clear whether or not the Convention protects individuals in the way that 
is claimed and, as a corollary, whether the State action impugned violates the Convention for 
failing to vindicate the right in question.
13
 Moreover, the Court has tended not to apply European 
consensus if the Contracting States had commenced drafting a new Protocol to deal with the 
matter under consideration.
14
 In the cases where European consensus has been deployed to date 
the Court has reached one of three conclusions: i) that there is a lack of European consensus, 
usually meaning that the impugned law is Convention-compatible
15
 unless manifestly 
                                                 
10
 See further F de Londras, ‘The European Court of Human Rights, Dual Functionality, and the Future of the Court 
after Interlaken’ UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No. 45/2011 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773430> 
11
 Dzehtsiarou (n 5) 541-8. 
12
 For an overview see B Verschraegen, ‘The right to Private Life and Family Life, The Right to Marry and to Found 
a Family, and the Prohibition of Discrimination’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs (eds), Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe (Intersentia, 2003). 
13
 See, for example Lautsi v Italy, Application No 30814/06, Judgment of 18 March 2011; Christine Goodwin v the 
United Kingdom, Application No 28957/95, Judgment of 11 July 2002. For detailed discussion see Dzehtsiarou (n 5) 
546-8. 
14
 A Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 HRLR 57, 69; Öcalan v Turkey, 
Application No 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005. 
15
 See for example, Lautsi (n 13) [70]; Dickson v United Kingdom, Application No 44362/04, Judgment of 4 
December 2007 [78]; Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom, Application No 22985/93, Judgment of 30 July 
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unreasonable, disproportionate or unnecessary in a democratic society; ii) that there is an 
identifiable European consensus of which the impugned law is part and, therefore, that the law is 
Convention-compatible;
16
 or iii) that there is an identifiable European consensus with which the 
impugned law is incompatible, usually meaning that it is Convention-incompatible. Our concern 
is with the third of these scenarios.  
Where a European consensus is identified and a respondent State’s law falls outside of it 
without reasonable justification, the Court normally finds a violation of the Convention.
17
 
Whether or not divergence from the European consensus is justified is, of course the core 
question in such situations. The Court has identified the particular historical and social context 
extant in a respondent State as a justification for divergence, although the longer the divergence 
persists the more strongly it has to be justified, and in fact no case has yet been found to reach 
the threshold for justification under this ground.
18
 Divergence from European consensus can also 
be justified on the basis of an incompatible international trend to which the impugned State 
action might be said to aligned, although that is rare indeed.
19
 Finally—and of key concern in 
this article—divergence from the European consensus might be justified on the basis of an 
internal consensus that ‘trumps’ that found at a regional level. Internal consensus can be defined 
as a widespread (although not unanimous) attitude to a legal issue that is held by the majority of 
people within the respondent State. In net terms the internal consensus claim is twofold: first that 
in fact an internal consensus exists and can be verified; and second that the internal consensus is 
sufficient to justify divergence from (i.e. to trump) the identified European consensus and, as a 
result, that there is no incompatibility with the Convention. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1998 [55]. In such cases a wide margin of appreciation is usually identified: Evans v United Kingdom, Application 
No 6339/05, Judgment of 10 April 2007 [77].   
16
 Stoll v Switzerland, Application No 69698/01, Judgment of 10 December 2007 [155].   
17
 See, eg, Ünal Tekeli v Turkey, Application No 48616/99, Judgment of 16 November 2004; Tănase v Moldova, 
Application No 7/08, Judgment of 27 April 2010; DH and Others v the Czech Republic, Application No 57325/00, 
Judgment of 13 November 2007; Micallef v Malta, Application No 17056/06, Judgment of 15 October 2009. 
18
 Republican Party of Russia v Russia, Application No 12976/07, Judgment of 12 April 2011, [127-130]; Tănase v 
Moldova (n 17) para [172]. 
19
 In Goodwin v the United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights stated that lack of European consensus 
could not justify allowing the respondent State a wide margin of appreciation in relation to transsexuals’ rights, 
because of  ‘the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased 
social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals’: 
Christine Goodwin (n 13) [85]. In this case the continuing international trend was not deployed to trump the existing 
consensus but rather was used to overcome the lack of such consensus. However, the reasoning behind this 
argument is similar to trumping consensus, namely a solution supported by European consensus or lack thereof is 
disregarded under the justification of another trend—this time, an international one.  
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It is rare for States to try to argue for trumping internal consensus, and in fact no such 
argument had succeeded prior to A, B & C. The internal consensus argument was deployed by 
the British Government in Tyrer v the United Kingdom.
20
 Tyrer concerned the long-standing 
practice of sentencing people to ‘birching’ in criminal trials in the Isle of Man.21 Tyrer—a 
juvenile who had been subjected to this punishment—claimed that it contravened Article 3 of the 
Convention, which protects against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 
The UK claimed, inter alia, that corporal punishment ‘did not outrage public opinion in the 
Island’22 and ought to be saved from Convention incompatibility on that basis. The Court 
disagreed, holding: 
 
…even assuming that local public opinion can have an incidence on the interpretation of 
the concept of ‘degrading punishment’ appearing in Article 3, the Court does not regard it 
as established that judicial corporal punishment is not considered degrading by those 
members of the Manx population who favour its retention: it might well be that one of the 
reasons why they view the penalty as an effective deterrent is precisely the element of 
degradation which it involves. As regards their belief that judicial corporal punishment 
deters criminals, it must be pointed out that a punishment does not lose its degrading 
character just because it is believed to be, or actually is, an effective deterrent or aid to 
crime control. Above all, as the Court must emphasise, it is never permissible to have 
recourse to punishments which are contrary to Article 3...whatever their deterrent effect 
may be.
23
 
 
Although the Court in Tyrer did not entirely rule out the prospect that an internal consensus 
might be relevant in analysing whether a particular State action contravenes the Convention, it 
clearly rejected any such argument in this case. This was based on both the nature of the right in 
question as an absolute right and on the European consensus as regards corporal punishment. In 
the latter connection, the Court held that it ‘cannot but be influenced by the developments and 
                                                 
20
 Tyrer v the United Kingdom, Application No 5856/72, Judgment of 25 April 1978. 
21
 Birching was a statutorily regulated form of corporal punishment conducted by police officers (Summary 
Jurisdiction Act 1960, section 10). Regulation of this punishment was so precise that the size and weight of the cane 
to be used was specified in the Directive of the Lieutenant-Governor of 30 May 1960. 
22
 Tyrer (n 20) [31]. 
23
 Ibid. 
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commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe 
in this field’.24 Thus, even if the internal consensus existed, which the Court doubted, it seems 
that it was not an internal trumping consensus. Similar claims arose in the case of Dudgeon v the 
United Kingdom.
25
 Dudgeon claimed that the continuation in force of ‘the abominable crime of 
buggery’ as prohibited by sections 61 and 62 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 was a 
violation of the Convention. The UK argued that continued criminalisation of male homosexual 
sex in Northern Ireland did not contravene the Convention based on what it claimed was ‘the 
strength of feeling in Northern Ireland against the proposed change, and in particular the strength 
of the view that it would be seriously damaging to the moral fabric of Northern Irish society’ to 
decriminalise such acts.
26
 The UK further argued that Northern Ireland was a particularly 
conservative society that placed greater emphasis than most Convention States on religion, even 
as applied to heterosexual conduct.
27
 The thrust of this argument was that even if the European 
consensus was for the decriminalisation of consensual homosexual sex between men, Northern 
Ireland contained an internal trumping consensus that ought to save the law in that jurisdiction 
from incompatibility. Although the Court accepted that these claims were relevant to the matter 
at bar, it did not agree that there existed any internal trumping consensus. Instead, the Court held 
that the Convention was violated, finding:   
 
As compared with the era when that legislation was enacted, there is now a better 
understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to 
the extent that in the great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe it is no 
longer considered to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind 
now in question as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the criminal law 
should be applied; the Court cannot overlook the marked changes which have occurred in 
this regard in the domestic law of the member States.
28
 
 
                                                 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, Application No 7525/76, Judgment of 23 September 1981. 
26
 Ibid [46]. 
27
 Ibid [56]. 
28
 Ibid [60]. 
7 
 
Neither Tyrer nor Dudgeon categorically ruled out the possibility that an internal trumping 
consensus could exist, but in neither case was the claim successful. This is significant, not least 
because in Dudgeon at least what was in question was a matter of significant moral debate and 
disagreement. Dudgeon was decided in 1981 when homosexual sex was unlawful in many 
countries and only one country in the world—Norway—had a law protecting people from 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (and that itself was introduced in 1981).
29
 This 
suggests that even in an area of moral sensitivity an alleged internal trumping consensus required 
hefty supporting materials in order to succeed. The same proved not, however, to be the case in 
A, B & C v Ireland.
30
 
 
C. Trumping Consensus in A, B & C v Ireland 
 
A, B & C v Ireland concerned the extremely restrictive abortion regime in place in Ireland and 
claims of its incompatibility with the Convention. Although abortion is permitted under the Irish 
Constitution where the life of the mother is at risk
31
 (including from suicide
32
), no legislation has 
ever been introduced regulating the mechanism by which medical professionals can determine 
whether or not a woman’s life is endangered and certify that an abortion is constitutionally 
permissible.
33
 Furthermore, serious risk to the life (as opposed to the health) of the mother is the 
only situation in which an abortion can be legally acquired in Ireland, although travel to another 
jurisdiction in order to procure an abortion is permitted and information relating to abortion is 
freely available.
34
 The claimants in A, B & C challenged this abortion regime, claiming firstly 
that it violated the Convention because there was no clear and safe way of determining whether 
someone was entitled to an abortion within the existing constitutional limits, and secondly 
because it was claimed that the restrictiveness of the regime itself violated the Convention 
partially because it was out of step with the prevailing position across the Council of Europe 
                                                 
29
 In 1981 Paragraph 349(a) of the Norwegian Penal Code was amended to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in the provision of goods and services and in access to public gatherings. 
30
 A, B & C (n 7). 
31
 Art 40.3.3, Bunreacht ne hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland). 
32
 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1 (Supreme Court of Ireland, 5 March 1992). 
33
 See generally J Schweppe (ed), The Unborn Child, Article 40.3.3° and Abortion in Ireland: 25 Years of 
Protection? (Liffey Press, 2008). 
34
 Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995. 
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States. In relation to the former, the Court reiterated its earlier case law
35
 that where abortion is 
legally permitted there must be a mechanism to acquire it and found a violation on that basis. 
In relation to the latter claim, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed its long-
standing position that abortion was an area in relation to which member States enjoyed a 
significant margin of appreciation,
36
 but then proceeded to State that ‘the question remains 
whether this wide margin of appreciation is narrowed by the existence of a relevant consensus’.37 
In other words, was the extreme restriction of abortion in Ireland to cases where the pregnancy 
and the woman’s life were incompatible acceptable under the Convention, or did it require that 
abortion would be more broadly available including especially where the pregnancy endangered 
the health of the woman? The Court confirmed that there was a consensus amongst a substantial 
majority of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion on 
broader grounds than that permitted under Irish law,
38
 but held that this consensus did not 
decisively narrow the State’s margin of appreciation.39 This was because the limited availability 
of abortion in Ireland was said to be based on the ‘profound moral views’40 of the Irish people, 
which constituted a trumping internal consensus. In this respect, internal consensus and 
European consensus were applied as competing variables determining the scope of the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the respondent State. 
This conclusion was based on the argument proposed by the Irish government that the 
results of three constitutional referenda on abortion,
41
 together with public demands for 
guarantees about abortion in the Maastricht
42
 and Lisbon
43
 referenda,
44
 evidenced an internal 
                                                 
35
 Tysiąc v Poland, Application No 5410/03, Judgment of 20 March 2007. 
36
 A, B. and C. (n 7) [185]. 
37
 Ibid [233]-[234]. 
38
 Ibid [235]. 
39
 Ibid [236]. 
40
 Ibid [126]. 
41
 Abortion referenda were held in 1983 (introducing the 8
th
 Amendment to the Constitution (protecting the life of 
the unborn with equal protection to the life of the mother)), 1992 (introducing the 13
th
 Amendment to the 
Constitution (allowing for freedom to travel for the purposes of abortion) and 14
th
 Amendment to the Constitution 
(allowing for the provision of information relating to abortion), but rejecting a proposed amendment to preclude 
abortion where the life of the mother was endangered by the risk of suicide), and in 2002 (rejecting a proposal to 
preclude abortion where the life of the mother is endangered by suicide). For a comprehensive outline see, e.g., G 
Hogan & G Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4
th
 edn, Tottel, 2003). 
42
 Concerns about abortion becoming more available in Ireland through EU intervention resulted in Protocol 17 of 
the Maastricht Treaty, which provides ‘[n]othing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the 
application in Ireland of Art 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland’. 
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consensus of a profound nature. As discussed further below, the methodology applied in 
reaching this decision is questionable, but notwithstanding that the Court concluded that ‘the 
impugned restrictions in the present case were based on profound moral values concerning the 
nature of life which were reflected in the stance of the majority of the Irish people against 
abortion during the 1983 referendum and which have not been demonstrated to have relevantly 
changed since then’.45 Although there was a European consensus inasmuch as Ireland is one of 
only a few member States to restrict abortion to situations where the life, as opposed to the 
health, of the mother is at risk,
46
 the Court found that—as previously held in Vo v France47—
there is no legal or scientific consensus in Europe as to when life begins.
48
 This seems to have 
been perceived as a factor to weaken the probative nature of the European consensus, further 
highlighting the vulnerability of the European consensus to being trumped by internal consense. 
The Court stated: 
 
[T]he question of when the right to life begins came within the States’ margin of 
appreciation because there was no European consensus on the scientific and legal 
definition of the beginning of life, so that it was impossible to answer the question 
whether the unborn was a person to be protected for the purposes of Article 2. Since the 
rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those of the mother are inextricably 
interconnected, the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn 
necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the 
conflicting rights of the mother. It follows that, even if it appears from the national laws 
referred to that most Contracting Parties may in their legislation have resolved those 
conflicting rights and interests in favour of greater legal access to abortion, this consensus 
                                                                                                                                                             
43
 In advance of the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty the European Council (Heads of Government) adopted 
a Decision including, in Section A, a guarantee that ‘[n]othing in the Treaty of Lisbon attributing legal status to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, or in the provisions of that Treaty in the area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice affects in any way the scope and applicability of the protection of the right to life in Art 40.3.1, 
40.3.2 and 40.3.3…[of] the Constitution of Ireland’. 
44
 Changes to the founding treaties of the European Union that alter the ‘essential scope or objectives’ of the 
European Union can only be ratified by Ireland is approved by constitutional referendum: Crotty v An Taoiseach 
[1987] IR 713 (Supreme Court of Ireland, 9 April 1987). 
45
 A, B. and C. (n 7) [226].  
46
 Andorra, Malta and San Marino prohibit abortion in all circumstances.  
47
 Vo v France, Application No 53924/00, Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
48
 A, B. and C. (n 7) [237] 
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cannot be a decisive factor in the Court’s examination of whether the impugned 
prohibition on abortion in Ireland for health and well-being reasons struck a fair balance 
between the conflicting rights and interests, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation 
of the Convention.
49
 
 
Here the Court is dancing around—although never precisely pinning down—the relationship 
between degree of abortion availability and views on the moment that life begins. A more precise 
analysis is found in the concurrence by Irish ad hoc judge, Judge Finlay-Geoghegan. She makes 
the connection inasmuch as she sees it between Vo and the decision in A, B & C more clear by 
holding that the European consensus was not one as to when life began and did not therefore go 
to the core public policy concern underpinning the Irish position. In other words, the two 
consensuses (European v internal) were, in her view, related to two different questions (how 
available abortion is (European) v when life begins (Irish)). As a result, it did not operate to 
narrow Ireland’s margin of appreciation.50 Both this concurrence and the decision of the majority 
arguably conflate questions about when life begins (a question that fundamentally goes to 
whether abortion should be permitted at all and, if so, how far into pregnancy) and circumstances 
in which abortion should be permitted for reasons connected to maternal welfare (where life is at 
risk only, or where life or health is at risk).
51
 Indeed, much the same point was made in the 
dissenting judgment.
52
 
The application of a trumping internal consensus was criticised by Judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Fura, Hirvelä, Malinverni and Poalelungi dissenting, who wrote:  
 
[I]t is the first time that the Court has disregarded the existence of a European consensus 
on the basis of ‘profound moral views’. Even assuming that these profound moral views 
are still well embedded in the conscience of the majority of Irish people, to consider that 
                                                 
49
 Ibid [237]. 
50
 Ibid, Concurring Opinion of Judge Finlay-Geoghegan,[6]. 
51
 We are not concerned here with the outcome as it relates to the Court’s jurisprudence on abortion per se. On that 
see, e.g. S McGuinness, ‘A, B and C Leads to D (For Delegation!)’ (2011) 19 Med Law Rev 476. 
52
 A, B. and C. (n 7) Dissenting Judgment, [2]. 
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this can override the European consensus, which tends in a completely different direction, 
is a real and dangerous new departure in the Court’s case-law.53 
 
The danger of this departure is, we contend, largely bound up in the potential risk that it poses to 
the continuing development of a rights-based, constitutionalist public order throughout the 
European continent should the notion of trumping internal consensus not be left to perish on the 
rock of A, B & C. 
 
D. Trumping Consensus and Frustrated Constitutionalism 
 
Although internal consensus has only been allowed to ‘trump’ European consensus in the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on one occasion, the phenomenon raises serious concerns. These 
concerns are deeply linked to the constitutionalist mission and identity of the Court. Even though 
the European Court of Human Rights is a not a supreme court for Europe, or even a 
constitutional court in the traditional sense, it does have an important constitutionalist function 
and identity.
54
 This is reflected in the fact that, at its heart, the Court’s function is to ensure 
compliance with, and the development of, the Convention in a manner that contributes to the 
cultivation (together with the Court of Justice of the European Union) of an ordre publique for 
the continent in which basic minimum rights-based constitutionalist requirements are elaborated 
and safeguarded through domestic implementation and regional supervision.
55
 In order to 
succeed in its constitutionalist mission the Court needs the same resources as other 
constitutionalist courts, including legitimacy.
56
 Dzehtsiarou has previously argued that the 
                                                 
53
 Ibid, Dissenting Judgment, [9]. 
54
 S Hennette-Vauchez, ‘Reformatory Rationales Mismatch the Plural Paths of Legitimacy of ECHR Law’ in Jonas 
Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics 
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concept and methodology of European consensus is itself a legitimacy-enhancing measure, 
enhancing its standing in the eyes of the member States, provided it is transparently and 
accurately constructed and consistently deployed.
57
 Furthermore, the impact that a judgment or 
series of judgments has on the lived experiences of those residing within the espace juridique
58
 
of the Convention has implications for the extent to which the people covered by the Convention 
consider it and its court to be legitimate. Across each of these legitimacy planes (i.e. member 
States and protected individuals) trumping internal consensus has potentially troublesome and 
delegitimising effects. Together, these effects undermine the constitutionalist impact and 
capacity of the Court. 
In A, B & C trumping internal consensus allowed for the continuation of the status quo in 
Ireland, as desired by the Irish government itself. It is to be expected that this would in fact 
always be the result where a trumping internal consensus is found. In that respect it is likely that 
the respondent State in question would consider the use of trumping internal consensus to be a 
legitimising factor for that particular judgment, taking into account the supposedly unique and 
deeply engrained national sentiment in favour of the position as it stands. Indeed, failure to take 
what is considered to be ‘proper’ account of the sentiment and tradition within a member State 
has, on occasion, been the basis for sharp criticism and allegations of illegitimacy levied against 
decisions emanating from Strasbourg in the past.
59
 Among the other member States, however, 
trumping internal consensus potentially undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Court 
and the Convention more broadly.  
First of all it may act to ‘fudge’ the question of what a particular provision of the 
Convention requires of states and of whether (and, if so, under what circumstances) a State can 
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provide a level of protection lower than that apparently required but still remain within the 
bounds of the Convention. In other words, States may wonder what exactly it is that the 
Convention requires of them and whether they can themselves construct a compelling enough 
case for an internal consensus that would allow for them to ‘trump’ the general European 
position. Furthermore, a State that currently forms part of the European consensus as identified 
by the Court may in fact have in place a certain legal or regulatory regime precisely because it 
considered that to be required in order to be Convention compliant, even if it was not particularly 
desired. In other words, there may be situations where the Convention has had precisely the 
exogenous force on domestic legal and regulatory systems that was desired (i.e. it has resulted in 
domestic legal change ‘upwards’ even without a judgment against the State), but the 
identification of a trumping internal consensus in one State may either foster resentment in other 
States or result in other States recalibrating laws ‘downwards’ on the basis of a self-declared 
trumping internal consensus. That is arguably more likely to happen in relation to matters of 
particular moral and social controversy—such as abortion—where campaigners on a particular 
side of the debate might argue that in fact the Convention does not require as liberal a legal 
regime as exists and in fact that further restricting individual freedoms would be permissible 
based on the case in which a trumping internal consensus was established.  
Second, the notion that European consensus might be subordinate to internal consensus 
within any particular State might bolster broader arguments that the Convention ought to be 
subordinate to decisions taken at the national level. This would likely undermine the 
effectiveness and harmonising capacity of judgments emanating from the Strasbourg Court. At 
its core, an argument of trumping internal consensus is one that makes the nature and content of 
an international legal obligation subject to public sentiment and public acceptance of obligations 
within the contracting party, notwithstanding the fact that individuals are not full subjects of 
international law. This adds to the counterintuitive nature of the proposition that commonly 
accepted minimal human rights standards would be subordinate to public sentiment within a 
respondent State.    
Thus, trumping internal consensus has important implications for the harmonisation 
mission of the Convention and, by corollary, the Court itself. Indeed, the dissenting judges in A, 
B & C v Ireland recognised as much themselves when they held: 
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According to the Convention case-law, in situations where the Court finds that a 
consensus exists among European States on a matter touching upon a human right, it 
usually concludes that that consensus decisively narrows the margin of appreciation 
which might otherwise exist if no such consensus were demonstrated. This approach is 
commensurate with the “harmonising” role of the Convention’s case-law: indeed, one of 
the paramount functions of the case-law is to gradually create a harmonious application 
of human rights protection, cutting across the national boundaries of the Contracting 
States and allowing the individuals within their jurisdiction to enjoy, without 
discrimination, equal protection regardless of their place of residence….Even assuming 
that these profound moral views are still well embedded in the conscience of the majority 
of Irish people, to consider that this can override the European consensus, which tends in 
a completely different direction, is a real and dangerous new departure in the Court’s 
case-law.
60
 
 
At a more basic level, trumping internal consensus as applied in A, B & C v Ireland raises serious 
methodological concerns. The occasional incoherence and incomplete reasoning in decisions of 
the Court have often been remarked upon.
61
 Indeed, some decision-making mechanisms or 
principles of the Court, including the margin of appreciation and European consensus, have been 
especially singled out for criticism.
62
 Even those who argue that European consensus has an 
important legitimising role to play in the canon of the Convention have accepted that it is 
methodologically problematic.
63
 However, at least with European consensus the laws and 
policies of a number of States are identified and taken into account with some degree of 
transparency; where an internal consensus is identified the methodological concerns raised are 
arguably more acute. Unlike with comparative political and legal analysis—which is essentially 
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the method used for European consensus—internal consensus tends to be identified through a 
crude analysis of sentiment. This was certainly the case in A, B & C v Ireland. 
The trumping internal consensus in A, B & C was—as mentioned above—based on an 
allegedly profound moral value of the Irish people. This was established by reference to the 
outcomes of three hotly disputed constitutional referenda and demands made in the somewhat 
notoriously fraught context of EU-treaty referenda. The Court accepted that the net result in 
these referenda could be read as communicating accurately the position of the Irish people, i.e. 
that they were happy with the abortion regime as it stands in Ireland. However, a closer mining 
of the materials relied upon by the Court tells a somewhat more complex story. In 1983, the 8
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution (protecting the right to life of the unborn with equal regard to the 
right to life of the mother) was passed by a ‘yes’ vote of 66.45 per cent (66.9 per cent of the valid 
poll). Inasmuch as it concerned the availability of abortion in Ireland, the referendum in 1993 
saw 62.27 per cent of voters who turned out (and 65.35 per cent of the valid poll) reject a 
proposal to restrict abortion to a greater degree than that determined by the Supreme Court in 
Attorney General v X (in which the risk of suicide was found to permit of abortion under the 
terms of the Constitution).
64
 The People had been asked to amend the Constitution to make it 
clear that a risk to the life of the mother emanating from the possibility of suicide would not be 
sufficient to make abortion constitutionally permissible; they were not asked whether they 
wanted to make abortion more liberal. Thus, the ‘no’ vote in that referendum was a simple 
refusal to further restrict abortion in Ireland. The same was true in the 2002 constitutional 
referendum, when 50.15 per cent of the people who voted (a mere 42.89 per cent turnout) 
refused once more to restrict abortion further(equating to 50.42 per cent of the valid poll).
65
 
Rather than standing for the proposition that the Irish people have a deeply held or profound 
moral position that supports the status quo, as claimed by the Court, these referenda simply stand 
for the proposition that the Irish people have not been willing to support the amendments to the 
Constitution as presented to them in these referenda. The European Court of Human Rights also 
suggested that the demands for guarantees from the EU in relation to abortion in the Maastricht 
and Lisbon referenda reinforced the profound moral position advocated by the Irish government, 
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however the most that could be said about these guarantees is that sufficient concern was 
expressed or perceived in these campaigns that the EU might force a change to Irish abortion law 
(in contrast to a domestically initiated change) as to make the government believe such 
guarantees were required.  
It is perhaps too much to expect an international court—or perhaps even any court—to be 
able to take into full account the socio-political context that gives real meaning to referendum 
results, but if that is the case then perhaps the best course of action for the Court is not to read 
any meaning into these resulted at all outside of their role in determining the current legal 
position. Otherwise, as was the case in A, B & C v Ireland, the Court will pronounce a moral 
position that is suspect (at best) to the people of the country in question and who are alleged to 
hold this position.  
If the European Court of Human Rights continues to allow internal consensus to trump 
European consensus it runs the risk of encountering unanticipated consequences within the 
respondent States themselves. This is fundamentally because, at least as deployed in A, B & C v 
Ireland, trumping internal consensus acts as a fudge allowing the Court to escape laying down 
the exact parameters of Convention rights in contentious areas. Rather than clearly stating that 
the Convention does or does not recognise a right to access abortion where a woman’s health is 
in danger, the Court held that Ireland could determine the scope of its own abortion regime but 
that once such a decision had been taken appropriate systems for accessing the services had be 
put in place. Absent those systems there was a violation of the Convention. Rather than set down 
a clear minimum standard of rights protection, which is the core function of the Court and 
Convention, the Court thereby placed abortion firmly within the domestic sphere and left 
apparently complete discretion to the State. The immediate reaction in Ireland was for pro-choice 
campaigners to call for legislation regulating abortion in line with the limited constitutional 
exemption 
66
and for pro-life campaigners to call for a new referendum to further restrict the 
availability of abortion.
67
 The Strasbourg Court’s decision left both options open; without a 
constitutional change the decision does seem to require regulatory action, but it does not 
preclude closing abortion off even further, perhaps even introducing an absolute ban on abortion 
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in Ireland, which (as it would have to be done by referendum
68
) could subsequently be 
represented as evidence of an internal consensus based on profound moral values. Any attempt to 
row back on the trumping internal consensus approach taken in A, B & C would be difficult to 
justify in such circumstances as—unlike in cases of evolutive jurisprudence using European 
consensus—the ‘consensus’ deemed most potent in the area of abortion now seems to be an 
internal, rather than an external, one. 
 
E. Conclusions 
 
The objections outlined above are fundamentally concerned with the danger that trumping 
constitutionalism would in fact represent a mechanism by which the role of the Court and the 
Convention in European constitutionalisation would be undermined. Understood as a process of 
building up a European ordre publique comprising the Convention, the Treaties Founding the 
European Union and the acquis emerging from both, the emerging constitutionalist principles 
and laws are heavily influenced by the rights-based principles that emerge from the Strasbourg 
Court. This influence has always been considerable, not only inasmuch as the member States 
have generally tended to respond positively to the majority of the judgments handed down 
against them, but also because other States have tended to follow suit in at least some 
circumstances notwithstanding the fact that judgments are strictly binding only on those States 
against whom they are handed down.
69
 Furthermore, since the parallelism between 
Community/Union and Convention law in respect of rights was identified in the Bosphorus 
case,
70
 an alignment between the EU and the decisions of the Court has been discernible. Indeed, 
that alignment will become very much concretised when the European Union accedes to the 
Convention, making the Convention and its principles binding on the Union and, by extension, 
on all of the member States of the Union when applying or implementing EU law. There is an 
                                                 
68
 The Irish Constitution can only be amended by referendum of the people: Art 46, Bunreacht na hÉireann 
(Constitution of Ireland). 
69
 Art 46, European Convention on Human Rights. 
70
 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, Application No 45036/98, Judgment of 30 
June 2005. 
*
 Professor of Law, Durham Law School, fiona.de-londras@durham.ac.uk; Lecturer in Law, University of Surrey 
Law School, k.dzehtsiarou@surrey.ac.uk. This paper originated as a ‘discourse’ of the Irish Society of International 
Law (ISIL). We are grateful to the ISIL, Carl Grainger and attendees for their comments at the time 
 
18 
 
odd paradox in the emergence of what seems to be a counter-constitutionalist notion of trumping 
internal consensus in A, B & C v Ireland just as we stand on the brink of taking such a significant 
step in constitutionalising the two European legal orders. 
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